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 COMPLEXITY AND CAUSATION
 Tim Burke
 'The relationship between cause and effect is one of the cen-
 tral objects of investigation in most modern academic disci-
 plines. Disciplines which are especially sensitive to or interested
 in the passage of time are particularly concerned with causation,
 and of those, perhaps history most of all.
 This is not to say that historical scholarship must necessarily be
 focused on arguments about causation and causality. Many works
 of history are more descriptive and aim to provide less an ac-
 count of the why of historical change than an account of the
 what of history. In a more elaborate vein, historical writing influ-
 enced by postmodernism, particularly by the work of Michel Fou-
 cault, remains wary of causal argument and its tendency to look
 for origins, preferring instead what Foucault called "genealogy,"
 a style of historical writing focused on process and development
 over time without recourse to causal arguments which situate
 themselves outside of or underneath the history being
 described.1
 Historians face some distinctive problems in dealing with cau-
 sation. With the exception of economic or other quantitative his-
 torical research that is dealing with extremely rich and rigorously
 collective data, most fields of historical study must make causal
 arguments without the ability to repeat experiments and without
 statistical tools like regression analysis that allow other disciplines
 to select among a host of competing variables to isolate and de-
 scribe the relative magnitude of various causes of observed ef-
 fects. Causation for historians is largely a matter of persuasive
 argument. As R.G. Collingwood put it, historians do not identify
 events and then ponder their causes separately, as scientists do.
 When a historian "knows what happened, he already knows why
 Tim Burke is Associate Professor of History at Swarthmore College.
 Soundings 90.1-2 (Spring/Summer 2007). ISSN 0038-1861.
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 it happened" because cause, event, and effect are unveiled
 through the work of interpretation rather than empirical discov-
 ery.2 To some extent, such arguments among historians can re-
 semble or draw usefully upon the more rigorous approach to
 causality in analytic philosophy, but clear definitions of events,
 effects, and causes themselves in history necessarily refer to pro-
 foundly contestable, fuzzy, or ambiguous phenomena. As the
 philosopher Maurice Mandelbaum has observed, arguments
 about causation in formal historical scholarship often tend to
 draw upon a diverse mix of philosophical and everyday anteced-
 ents, often implicitly so.3
 Broadly speaking, causal arguments among historians since the
 mid-twentieth century have tended to divide into two approxi-
 mate camps. The first set of arguments operate at long scales of
 time, refer to underlying structures or forces, and are relatively
 deterministic in nature. The second tend towards short scales of
 time, refer to specific and granular events or episodes, and often
 stress the relatively contingent or unintended nature of causality.
 There are sophisticated strategies for integrating these levels of
 analysis, such as Anthony Giddens's theory of "structuration" that
 describes agency and structure as a dynamically recursive relation
 in which the contingent or unpredictable actions affect the more
 fixed or deterministic character of social structure, and vice-
 versa, in an endless feedback loop.4 Even with such integrations
 (not dissimilar to efforts by "compatibilist" philosophers to inte-
 grate free will and causal determinism), many individual histori-
 ans still tend to prefer operating at one or the other scale of
 causal explanation.5
 In both cases, arguments about causation tend to run into seri-
 ous problems. For the historian who emphasizes the vast ex-
 panses of time of the longue durée and the determinate role of
 underlying structures, there is a fundamental question, posed
 best by Salman Rushdie in his novel The Satanic Verses: How does
 newness enter the world? If change over time is best understood
 as determined by underlying and highly deterministic structures,
 and best perceived in long scales, why should there ever be any-
 thing new in history? Why should there have been capitalism, or
 the expansion of Western Europe, or the French Revolution?
 There are a variety of ways to approach this basic problem.
 One is to deny or deemphasize the extent to which anything is,
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Wed, 04 Oct 2017 18:47:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Complexity and Causation 35
 in fact, new. For example, the social scientist Andre Gunder
 Frank has argued that the seeming break in global economic and
 political history that coincides with the rise of Western European
 societies to worldwide domination after 1500 and the spread of
 capitalism is largely an illusion, that there is only one global sys-
 tem which is 5,000 years old.6 Most specialized fields of historical
 scholarship feature work with related strategies to de-emphasize
 or even wholly erase a perceived break or disjuncture between
 eras or systems, or which argue against the understood novelty of
 particular events, a mode of historical writing which is sometimes
 described as "revisionism." For example, the field of medieval Eu-
 ropean history in recent years has engaged in a debate about
 whether there was ever such a thing as "feudalism."7
 Another argument is to reduce strongly the moments of genu-
 ine newness or novelty in global history to a small handful of
 important eras, or possibly even to a single instance, in a per-
 ceived divide between the modern and premodern eras of
 human history. Perhaps one of the most fertile and intensely de-
 bated bodies of historical knowledge is concerned with the un-
 derlying causes of modernity. The fewer the cases of actual
 "newness," the less difficulty they pose for strongly deterministic,
 large-scale accounts of causality, and the more that such novelty
 can be represented as a kind of singularity, an unusual instance
 of a large-scale contingent outcome arising from underlying so-
 cial structures. Versions of this strategy would include strongly
 teleological interpretations of history, most notably Marx's his-
 torical materialism. In this view, while there may be both new
 eras or periods in the history of particular societies and even
 short-term events which are novel or disjunctive, such newness
 arises from deterministic forces which guide overall historical
 change towards a predictable end. Relatedly, even non-Marxist
 historians who emphasize the long-term determinate role of ma-
 terialism sometimes argue that short-term and contingent tech-
 nological, environmental, or biological events give rise to social,
 cultural, economic, or political novelty within human societies.
 An earthquake which strikes a large city at a particular moment
 in its long-term evolution may produce far-reaching conse-
 quences which would not have necessarily followed had a similar
 earthquake struck the same city at a different historical moment.
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 Here more deterministic or large-scale arguments about causa-
 tion may end up casting a light on some of the problems that
 short-term and contingent approaches to causation in history
 face. The historian who presents a fairly deterministic argument
 about the history of a given technology often ends up obscuring
 the particular contingencies of its creation. A technology may be
 discovered, refined, and propagated through a series of relatively
 chance events. This technology may then lead to variant out-
 comes depending on where and when it comes into being. Seen
 from the longue durée, it may appear inevitable that early modern
 reorganization of textile production in northern Europe would
 lead into the industrial revolution in England which would lead
 to the industrial production of guns which would lead to the
 early machine gun which would give European armies a decisive
 military advantage in early twentieth-century Africa which would
 lead to the partition of the continent under European control,
 and so on. But seeing all this change over time as the causal ex-
 pression of long-term deterministic forces tends to obscure the
 long chance of seemingly unintended and often distinctively lo-
 cal or specific histories along the way. For each one of these his-
 tories, different outcomes seemed quite plausible. Break any link
 in such a long and elaborate chain, and serious problems of
 counterfactual reasoning tend to spring up.
 On the flip side, however, histories that dwell on events, on
 local scales of human interaction, and on the deliberate actions
 of human agents, tend to go begging for true causal arguments
 and often rely upon mere precedence. They simply assume, that
 is, that the causal explanation for a given event is to be found in
 the event which immediately preceded it. At this scale, explain-
 ing newness is no trouble at all: Human agents seem highly capa-
 ble of invention or imagination; institutions and everyday
 practice are demonstrably plastic; and events readily give rise to
 unpredicted or unintended consequences. The historian's prob-
 lem here is to explain continuity and repetition, to explain why
 events should consistently turn in a particular direction across a
 large spatial or temporal scale, or why similar patterns of histori-
 cal change should appear in disparate locales or cases.
 In both cases, moreover, historians who wish to talk about cau-
 sation face a basic problem with the rhetorical form of historical
 knowledge, which is almost invariably built around persuasive hu-
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 manistic writing. In such a format, crafting genuinely multivari-
 able causal arguments is profoundly difficult. While most
 historians recognize the intellectual danger posed by what Marc
 Bloch called "the fetish of the single cause," in practice historical
 argument at both the long and short scales of focus tends to
 make causal claims in terms of a very small handful of discrete
 events or underlying structures.8 Newly minted doctorates may
 excel at entering into long-running debates and pronouncing
 them to be "more complex" than previously appreciated, but
 there are limits to this kind of gesture. A work of historical schol-
 arship which pronounced a given event or effect to be irresolv-
 ably and infinitely multiple in its causation would add little to
 what we know, unless it were a general philosophical assault on
 all discussions of causality in historical study. At the same time,
 most historians recognize that emphasizing one or several causes
 (at whatever scale or level of determination) is ad arguendo, a nec-
 essary exaggeration or abstraction to permit the discussion to go
 forward.
 Emergence and Historical Causation
 I believe that the phenomenon known as "emergence" and a
 body of associated concepts such as complexity, complex adap-
 tive systems, networks, and agent-based systems hold considera-
 ble promise for thinking about causation in historical study.
 These concepts cannot resolve any of the problems that I have
 described thus far. These difficulties are intrinsic to historical
 reason and will always remain contentious. Emergence, however,
 casts some of these problems in a new light, or allows an ap-
 proach from some new angles. In the long term, it may also offer
 new forms of historical representation, new rhetorical or argu-
 mentative instruments. At the same time, emergence in historical
 thought runs into exactly the same epistemological and practical
 issues which sharply limit its potential usefulness in most, per-
 haps all, fields of human knowledge.
 The simplest definition of emergence as a phenomenon is that
 it is a process of change over time in which complex systems,
 patterns, or structures form in an unplanned or undesigned
 manner from simple or disorganized initial conditions. Typically,
 emergence results from the autonomous and simultaneous inter-
 action of a very large number of independent agents, each pos-
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 sessing a set of rules determining its actions within a particular
 environment.
 The free software NetLogo is a good platform for simulating
 emergence as a process. Let me describe one NetLogo simula-
 tion called "Termites." In it, there are two differently colored
 dots, each one pixel on a computer screen. One dot is a "ter-
 mite," the other a "stick." Both are randomly distributed at the
 start of a simulation within an otherwise empty environment.
 The sticks are merely environmental: They do not move or act.
 The termites act, governed by a set of simple rules. Each step of
 the simulation, they move one space in a random direction. If
 they end their move proximate to a stick, they "pick it up" (indi-
 cated by the termite changing color) . If while carrying a stick,
 they end their move next to yet another stick, they drop the stick.
 That's more or less it. In any given simulation of "Termites," with
 a random distribution of termites and sticks, the termites will
 eventually build a single round "pile" of sticks. (The display in
 NetLogo wraps around, so what may appear to be two "piles" at
 the top and bottom of the screen are in fact a single one.) This
 pile is a permanent feature of the environment once it appears:
 It will never be pulled apart. No other pile or structure will ap-
 pear. Its shape, once formed, is relatively stable. But the termites
 don't have any instruction to create a pile. There is no master
 agent governing their actions. There is no concept of a pile in
 their rules or in the environment.
 Fig.l Three stages of "Termites" in NetLogo
 Some tangible or empirical examples of the concept of emer-
 gence or self-organizing systems include the movement of social
 insects around obstacles, patterns of coordinated growth among
 slime molds, the coordinated action of bird flocks in flight, and
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 the formation of cloud patterns within Jupiter's atmosphere.
 More contentiously, some scientists have argued that human con-
 sciousness, evolution, and the large-scale structure of matter in
 the universe are all examples of emergent systems, where com-
 plex behavior or structures at one level have arisen from the in-
 teractions of simple rules determining the behavior of many
 autonomous agents or components at a lower level of
 organization.
 What should be clear from the outset, however, is that using
 the concept of emergence in historical argument about causality
 potentially offends (or possibly complements) both strongly de-
 terministic and strongly contingent inclinations in historical writ-
 ing. It may be easiest to see what this means through specific
 examples and in so doing, begin to sketch which kinds of histori-
 cal phenomenon are most richly served through the use of the
 concept. Let me start with a simple example: the technological
 history of the videotape player, most particularly, the eventual
 triumph of the VHS format over its rival Betamax format. This is
 an example which has drawn considerable interest from eco-
 nomic historians, historians of technology, and economists be-
 cause most observers consider the Beta format to have been
 technologically superior in many respects to VHS. As one group
 of scholars describes it, this story has some familiar elements to it
 in the context of business history: the relation between "first
 movers" and later entrants to the market, the influence of mar-
 keting strategies, and the struggle to establish technological stan-
 dards.9 Given that both formats had the backing of sizeable
 corporations with considerable power to influence consumer be-
 havior, this cannot be seen as a "pure" case of emergence (and
 indeed, in human history, I would argue that no event or phe-
 nomenon could ever be so). But the end result in many ways
 seems unpredictable from the initial entry of Beta format into
 the marketplace. This result was produced by the simultaneous
 activities of many autonomous agents ranging from marketers to
 consumers. The crystallization of preference for the VHS gave
 rise to a new kind of complexity in media consumption practices
 and ownership which no institution or interest controlled or an-
 ticipated at the outset of the introduction of the technology. In
 general, the concept of emergence seems to be particularly help-
 ful in understanding the history of technology. For example, it
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 has obvious applicability to the history of the Internet, and to the
 spread of cellphone usage throughout much of the developing
 world in the late 1990's and early 2OOO's.10
 The concept might also be productively used to compare the
 formation of similar or related industrial or economic systems.
 For instance, in southern Africa, the social history of gold mining
 since the 1870's has been the subject of considerable historical
 research; copper mining in northern Zambia and the southern
 Congo since the 1930's is less studied, but still relatively well-
 known.11 The differences between the social formations and la-
 bor systems in the two cases are substantial. Gold mining in
 South Africa was an important root of racial segregation and
 apartheid. The system treated workers as migrants who lived
 under tight control in guarded compounds during the term of
 their labor contract, and they were compelled to return to dis-
 tant rural home areas when they were not working in the mines.
 Copper mining in northern Zambia and southern Congo, in con-
 trast, relied upon "stabilized" labor, workers who lived with their
 families in permanent urban communities built by the mining
 companies around the sites of the mines themselves. It is possible
 to understand this difference in deterministic (often materialis-
 tic) terms. Gold mining in South Africa required lots of cheap
 but unskilled labor due in part to the nature of the gold deposits
 themselves and also, before the end of the gold standard in 1931,
 to the fixed price of gold in the world market. Copper mining
 required skilled labor, and the prices for copper were relatively
 favorable as African production was growing in size in the 1940's
 and 1950's. It is also possible to see the difference as a temporal
 one (that copper mine management had learned some lessons
 from the problems of the labor system on South African gold
 mines) or as an ideological one. (There were few white residents
 around the copper mines, but many in the Witwatersrand in
 South Africa.)
 Thinking about both systems as emergent phenomena does
 not displace the explanatory value of these arguments, but it
 does add a useful element to the comparison. The compound
 system of South Africa's gold mines, for example, stems in part
 from the earlier development of diamond mining. Some of the
 controls on African workers in diamond compounds were gov-
 ernmental concessions to individual white prospectors who were
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Wed, 04 Oct 2017 18:47:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Complexity and Causation 41
 using the cheap labor provided by a system of apartheid as a
 hedge against very thin economic margins (as also happened in
 California when prospectors needed cheap migrant labor after
 the initial wave of the 1849 gold rush). Other controls, such as
 putting iron gloves on African miners when they ascended from
 the diamond mines, were crude attempts to deal with the prob-
 lem of diamond smuggling, but quickly metamorphosed into
 more expansive systems of social control. Some aspects of the
 South African migrant labor system of 1900 could legitimately be
 said to be the compounded results of hasty improvisations and
 idiosyncratic initiatives during the initial development of indus-
 trial mining in that area. Equally, "stabilization" as a policy in the
 Copperbelt could be attributed to the intellectual and manage-
 rial backgrounds of key planners and executives involved in the
 initial development of the copper mines, and these backgrounds
 were, in turn, the product of industrial sociology in Europe and
 the United States during that era.
 There are numerous examples of historical events, at varying
 levels of scale, that could be illuminated by a consideration of the
 role of small or incremental actions by many agents working in-
 dependently of one another in creating larger and more com-
 plex systems that none of the actors intended to create. For
 instance, various treatments of "proto-industrialization" in West-
 ern Europe,12 such as Pat Hudson's study of wool textile produc-
 tion in England in the eighteenth century,13 suggest that the
 transition to industrial capitalism was marked by a complex rela-
 tion between quite different but successful systems of producing.
 In the Hudson case studies, there was a complex interaction be-
 tween technologically and industrially oriented "worsted" indus-
 try and a more artisinal woolen industry, with the latter often
 surprisingly outpacing the productivity of the former. Hudson's
 analysis seems to me to reveal the emergent character of the in-
 dustrial system of textile production. The history of these two sys-
 tems is in some sense the contingent and unplanned result of
 their interaction over time.
 At an even higher level of scale and abstraction, I would argue
 that there are perennial theoretical questions in historical schol-
 arship that benefit from a consideration of emergence and com-
 plexity. In my own recent work, I have been arguing for a
 reinterpretation of causal roots of the "new imperialism" of the
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 late nineteenth century, one which builds on both older and
 newer scholarly approaches to the issue. The "new imperialism"
 led to the seemingly abrupt division of almost all of Africa and
 parts of Asia and Oceania into the territorial possession of a
 handful of European powers. Historians have long puzzled over
 the reasons for this surge of imperial ambition, particularly given
 how relatively short-lived the resulting empires turned out to be.
 In my own work, I am less concerned with the overall phenome-
 non than the structure of the colonial governments put into
 place in Africa by England, France, Germany, and Belgium in the
 first decade of the twentieth century. These governments were
 typically constructed around principles that the British called "in-
 direct rule," a proposition that Africans would govern themselves
 but under tight constraints. They would have their own chiefs,
 but imperial authorities would select and control those chiefs.
 They would have their own customary laws, but those laws would
 be codified and selected by colonial officials. And so on.
 Many scholars studying Africa have chosen, to varying degrees,
 to see indirect rule as a highly designed system intended in both
 its generalities and particulars to maximize the capacity of impe-
 rial rulers to dominate African societies.14 An approach sensitive
 to emergent phenomena suggests instead that the system of indi-
 rect rule was the convergent result of many simultaneous and
 parallel improvisations and initiatives taken by both imperial and
 African agents in the chaotic period following the pronounce-
 ment of empire at the end of the nineteenth century. The result-
 ing norms and practices of colonial administration were in this
 view unplanned to some significant degree, and their contradic-
 tions were an unintended consequence of the improvisational
 process by which these governmental practices were created.
 This view has become more common recently among historians
 of colonial Africa, such as David Gordon.15
 This characterization of indirect rule runs into several
 problems. First is the history of imperial administration: Many of
 the bureaucratic procedures and processes put into place in Afri-
 can territories between 1870 and 1900 had precedents in other
 regions of the world such as India and the Caribbean or were
 based in some fashion on bureaucratic structures within Europe
 itself. Again, if emergence offers anything to the understanding
 of causality in historical scholarship, it is not as a "theory of every-
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 thing" which displaces all other frameworks or empirical knowl-
 edge. More importantly, if some of the bureaucratic and political
 processes characteristic of indirect rule in Africa were emergent
 phenomena, how did they become systematic, converging simul-
 taneously out of many different localities into a single large struc-
 ture of political power? Emergence theory as a way of thinking
 about causality really shines in answering such questiongs, be-
 cause it is centrally concerned with processes in which organiza-
 tion emerges from relative chaos, in which complex structures
 arise from simpler and more inchoate practices. If one thinks
 about imperial administrators, African elites, peasants, white
 farmers, and other discrete groups of agents in early colonial Af-
 rica as having "rulesets" that shaped their actions (much as the
 "termites" in NetLogo), it is quite possible to see how the simulta-
 neous interactions of their differing priorities could converge
 into a large-scale system without any of the actors necessarily in-
 tending to create that system (again, much as the "termites" in
 NetLogo create a circular pile).
 There are many large-scale events in human history that might
 similarly benefit from incorporating notions of emergence into
 debates about the causal roots of those events. Events which are
 characterized by seemingly sharp and expansive discontinuities
 or transformations of social, economic and political life over a
 short span of time seem especially suited to this approach. The
 evolution of the French Revolution from the world of Parisian
 salons, rural discontent, and aristocratic decline in the late ancien
 regime of France to the tumult and uncertainty of the initial over-
 throw of the monarchy and then to the Terror has been endlessly
 analyzed by historians. Many have sought to relate the Revolution
 to deep and relatively deterministic structural causes and others
 arguing for the relatively novel (but deliberate) character of the
 Revolution. Surely at least some of the story is equally well-de-
 scribed as emergent, about the unintended consequences of di-
 vergent activities by many pre-revolutionary actors in France, with
 the excesses of the Terror being as much a surprise and puzzle to
 the participants (and yet completely comprehensible as an emer-
 gent consequence of the earlier history) as to any later observers.
 Is emergence theory simply one more analytic perspective in
 the spectrum of approaches historians can employ? Perhaps, but
 even if not, it is a significant enough good in its own right. Emer-
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 gence is "good to think." Even when it is not a sufficient explana-
 tion in and of itself, it can serve as a system for identifying causal
 explanations and interpretations which might not intuitively oc-
 cur to a historian. Thomas Schelling's 1971 mathematical model-
 ling of residential segregation, now a staple in the scholarly
 literature on complexity and self-organizing systems,16 is a good
 example of this value. Schelling's model suggests that segrega-
 tion could potentially occur simply from the residential prefer-
 ences of individual agents in a confined space, e.g., that it does
 not require top-down enforcement or organization. This doesn't
 mean that this is in fact what has historically happened with resi-
 dential segregation in the United States or elsewhere, but it does
 open up a somewhat counter-intuitive hypothesis to explore in
 the context of existing historical scholarship about race and spa-
 tial segregation. Emergence in this context is a kind of analytic
 black box to pass our causal assumptions and arguments through
 to see if some unfamiliar or non-intuitive explanation or idea
 presents itself on the other side.
 Emergence theory also looks anew at the relationship between
 variables and outcomes in change over time. Most arguments
 about contingency in historical scholarship have to take the form
 of "for want of a nail," a narrow kind of counterfactual reasoning
 or argument in which the historian imagines a single variable be-
 ing different and then follows a chain of consequences flowing
 from that difference. Even with cases where different outcomes
 are highly plausible (say, for example, Lee winning at Gettys-
 burg) , the chain of counterfactual assertions becomes very diffi-
 cult to follow as it progresses from a single difference to larger
 and larger scales of historical transformation. From Gettysburg, it
 is relatively easy to get to a victory for the South in the Civil War.
 But from a victory for the South, it is quite difficult to go any
 further. Could a slave system of agricultural production have sur-
 vived the competitive force of Northern industrial capitalism? Or
 survived its own internal pressures? Could the South have main-
 tained political cohesion? The emergence model, however, does
 not measure the relationship between initial conditions and
 structural outcomes through single chains of causality, but
 through the massive simultaneity of agents acting independently
 of one another within a constrained environment or space. I can
 imagine, if only as an experiment, a "counterfactual engine" or
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 agent-based simulation-machine which could allow a historian to
 model or describe divergent historical outcomes involving hun-
 dreds or thousands of variables in motion at once.17
 In this respect, the introduction of emergence to arguments
 about historical causality functions similarly to the intervention
 of Stephen Jay Gould into evolutionary theory in his book Won-
 derful Life, which contends that the evolutionary process is shaped
 a great deal by accident and contingency.18 The key thing about
 Gould's argument is that it relates contingency at the microscale
 of organisms and their composition to the macroscale of evolu-
 tion and ecosystems as a whole. In history, scholars who place
 emphasis on contingency and agency often tend to do so against
 large-scale forms of determinism, asserting the autonomy of the
 individual and collective human subject and the importance of
 variable outcomes that derive from choice or willful action.
 Emergence does not reject that emphasis, but it puts that kind of
 contingency back into a new kind of relation to outcomes at
 larger scales.
 However, this relation is also the conceptual Achilles heel of
 emergence and complexity theory. Emergence occurs when
 many agents and forces acting simultaneously within a con-
 strained environment give rise to some new complex structure
 which then alters the environment within which those agents
 carry out their activities. When historians try to make causal argu-
 ments by focusing on a single variable, or a small handful of vari-
 ables, most would concede that they argue reductively out of
 necessity. Most of us know that the world is more complicated
 than that, but it is very difficult to describe the causal relation-
 ship between two equally complex states with all the many vari-
 ables that comprise them kept in view at once. Some kind of
 reductionism is an intellectual and rhetorical requirement.
 Emergence attractively envisions an asymmetrical relationship
 between one relatively simple state of affairs and a consequently
 more complex one: It gets to have its reductionist cake, but eat it
 too, to pose a dynamic causal relationship between simplicity and
 complexity, agency and structure.
 An emergent view of indirect rule in Africa or the French
 Revolution can hold that simple, unintentional, and simultane-
 ous interactions between a heterogeneous collection of human
 agents and institutions could give rise to novel large-scale politi-
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 cal and social systems. However, an emergence-based approach
 leaves us no way to understand the relationship between any par-
 ticular agent or variable in the initial conditions and the result-
 ing complex structures appearing at a later date, precisely
 because those structures come from the totality of all interactions
 between a large number of agents, institutions, and forces. The
 science writer John Horgan, writing skeptically about whether
 there are major new fields of scientific insight or knowledge
 which remain unknown, has argued that "chaoplexologists"
 (scholars studying emergence, chaos and complexity theory)
 have hard limits to the applicability of their theories.19 Certainly
 this seems the case with emergence in historical argument. Emer-
 gence allows for novel insights into the relationship between
 short-term contingency and long-term structure, but it also erects
 an epistemological veil between initial conditions and resulting
 complex structures. A historian can thus concede that it is en-
 tirely possible that any given action, agent or particular event was
 a "tipping point" that pushed one historical situation into a com-
 pletely different systemic state, the way that water undergoes a
 phase change to ice. But a historian thinking about causality in
 emergent terms cannot know which agents or actions will pro-
 duce which given systematic consequences because that is un-
 knowable by definition.
 For historians, that is less of a difficulty than it is in the hard
 social sciences, which tend to promise to measure the differential
 causal role of discrete variables or factors in producing particular
 outcomes. Historians already have to accept the irreducibility of
 complexity and the humility of interpretation that this entails.
 Emergence is just a new way to make peace with that
 intractability.
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